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Buffer Joint Ventures 
 
Zhiqi Chen and Thomas W. Ross 
 
 
Abstract 
 
While strategic alliances and joint ventures have become important organizational forms 
promising a variety of efficiency benefits for the economy, a body of research has been building 
showing that alliances between competitors can have significant anticompetitive consequences.  
This paper explores a particular kind of arrangement, here called a “buffer joint venture”, in 
which parent firms create an entity selling products located between their own locations in 
product or geographic space.  Depending upon the governance structure of the joint venture and 
the timing of price-setting by the joint venture and its parents, the buffer joint venture may 
reduce competition between the parents leading to higher prices and profits and lower social 
welfare.  The presence of such a joint venture can also affect the incentives for, and the effects 
of, collusion by the parents.   
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I. Introduction 
As has been recognized in a long literature, strategic alliances and joint ventures have become 
increasingly common in a wide variety of industries, perhaps most famously among airlines, 
pharmaceutical companies and automobile manufacturers.  While definitions vary, in our use of 
the terms, strategic alliances involve the ongoing cooperation of firms to provide new or 
improved products or services (on the output side), or to improve production/distribution 
methods (on the input side). Airline alliances, for example, can include the sharing of aircraft and 
interlining agreements to transfer passengers efficiently.  Joint ventures can be interpreted as the 
efforts of two or more independent firms to create a new, shared entity, to provide a new product 
or service.  As such they represent a particular kind of strategic alliance.  Standing somewhere 
intermediate in the spectrum between standard market-mediated relations between firms and 
complete integration, such arrangements promise a number of benefits to participants including 
the sharing of fixed costs, the combining of complementary talents and a way to facilitate the 
sharing of intellectual property.  
An extensive body of scholarly work on strategic alliances has developed in the 
management and economics literatures.  Management scholars have, for example, measured the 
increased frequency of these types of arrangements in a variety of industries, undertaken detailed 
case studies and created guidance on the factors that contribute generally to successful 
collaborations.1  The economics literature has provided a number of models to explain why firms 
might want to cooperate these ways, and explored the potential effects on rivals and consumers.2 
As has been shown in a number of papers, when the firms cooperating in an alliance are 
otherwise competitors in some markets, these kinds of arrangements can pose risks to 
competition.  For this reason a number of competition authorities have been paying increasing 
attention to alliances, for example by subjecting them to a kind of review similar to that designed 
                                                          
1 The literature is vast, much of it beginning in the early 1990s.  There is an interesting collection of papers in 
Beamish and Killing (1997a, 1997b, and 1997c).  See also, e.g., Contractor and Lorange (1988), Ohmae (1989), 
Urban and Vandemini (1992), Yoshino and Rangan (1995) and Lewis (1990).  Somewhat more recent work includes 
Kang and Sakai (2000), Elmuti and Kathawala (2001) and Todeva and Knoke (2005).  The leading management 
practitioner journals continue to show an interest as well, see, e.g. Dyer et al. (2001), Bamford et al. (2004), Kumar 
(2014) and Hoang and Rothaermel (2016).  
2 Much of this literature is discussed below in section II. 
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for mergers.3  Some competition authorities have gone so far as to issue guidelines on competitor 
collaborations.4   
This paper explores the potential for anticompetitive effects from a type of alliance not 
previously studied for this purpose.  This type of alliance involves the creation by parent firms of 
a joint venture that lies between them in product or geographic space.  Through their joint 
control of this new entity, the parents place a buffer between themselves, softening competition 
and potentially raising prices.  While the new product can undoubtedly add value for some 
consumers, the overall effect on consumer surplus and total welfare can be negative.   
The best examples of these kinds of alliances may be found in the automotive sector 
where firms might jointly produce products that combine key characteristics of the parents.5  
Also relevant would be alliances in the pharmaceutical industry in which, for example, brand 
name pharmaceutical companies partner with generic producers to manufacture branded generic 
drugs.6  
We study two ways through which this “buffer JV” can affect competition.  First, we 
examine the effects on parents’ prices and welfare of the creation of the JV when the parents’ 
prices are still set non-cooperatively.  Second, we explore the effect of introducing a JV on 
incentives to collude and on the effects of that collusion.  
We show that the buffer JV can indeed raise the prices and profits of parents even if the 
parent brand prices are set non-cooperatively.  The magnitudes of the effects depend on the 
governance structure of the JV and whether or not the JV is assigned the role of price leader in 
the market.  We also find that the presence of a buffer JV can make collusion more or less 
profitable, depending on the magnitude of fixed costs.    
                                                          
3 This has become common for airline alliances, for example.  On recent developments related to the granting of 
antitrust immunity for airline alliances in the U.S. see, Moss (2018).   See also the list of alliances reviewed for 
antitrust immunity by the U.S. Department of Transportation at:  
https://cms.dot.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/mission/office-policy/aviation-policy/9906/170104-all-immunized-
alliances-010318.pdf  (updated January 2018). 
4 See United States of America (2000), Canada (1995) and European Commission (2001).   
5 For example, the famous General Motors and Toyota joint venture, begun in the 1980s, which combined Toyota’s 
talents at quality small-car production with GM’s marketing and distribution abilities (and familiarity with supply 
chains and labor relations in the United States).  The partners produced new versions of the Toyota Corolla (the GM 
version called the Chevrolet Nova).  On this alliance, see Kwoka (1989).  A more recent example is the joint venture 
between Ford and the Chinese electric vehicle manufacturer Zotyne to create new models of electric automobiles.  
See, for example Reuters (2017). 
6 An example of this might be the partnership between the U.S. company Merck & Co. and India’s Sun 
Pharmaceutical Industries to produce and market “branded generic” versions of Merck products.  See, Karmali 
(2011).  See also a discussion on branded generics at Singer (2010).    
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We view this work as supportive of the concerns shared by many competition authorities 
regarding the possible harmful effects on competition that can arise when competitors cooperate 
even on what might not be viewed as competitive variables.  We demonstrate a new set of 
conditions under which such harm is possible. 
Section II reviews some of the key literature related to the effects of joint ventures on 
competition and describes the place of this paper in that literature.  Section III then lays out the 
basic static model of competition on which we build, and describes the pre-JV benchmark 
against which our joint venture outcomes will be compared.  The following sections, examine 
equilibria with joint ventures in cases where all price-setting is simultaneous (Section IV) and 
where the JV is made a price-leader (Section V).  Section VI explores questions related to the 
profitability and effects of collusion with and without a JV operating between its parents.  
Section VII then describes some implications of these results for competition policy and offers 
our conclusions.  
 
II.  Related Literature and Contributions of this Paper 
As noted above, there is now an extensive literature measuring the prevalence of, examining the 
motives for, and evaluating the effects of strategic alliances and joint ventures.  Here we very 
briefly review some of the key work done on the potential for anticompetitive effects through 
such arrangements.   
Past research has identified a number of ways that alliances can impact competition 
negatively.   One possible mechanism relates to the aligning of incentives that comes from cross 
ownership or joint/common ownership.  Even when partners make their pricing decisions 
completely independently, if they have minority ownership shares in their rivals – a not 
uncommon element in alliance agreements – their incentives to compete aggressively can be 
muted.  Early work in this area included important papers by Reynolds and Snapp (1986) and 
Bresnahan and Salop (1986) whose ideas were expanded upon in O’Brien and Salop (2000).7  
The potential effects of joint or common ownership of multiple firms operating in a single 
                                                          
7 See also the more recent work by Shelegia and Spiegel (2012).  Brito et al. (2014) showed how one could build a 
merger simulation model to predict the unilateral price effects of partial horizontal acquisitions.  For some of the 
antitrust implications see Shapiro and Willig (1990).  
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market has become a hot topic more recently, fueled by the prominence of a few large private 
equity investors in certain industries, such as airlines and banks.8   
A second mechanism leading to the potential for competitive harm involves the use of 
input-joint ventures to control the amount of output produced in a market downstream from the 
joint venture, as described, for example by Carlton and Salop (1996) , Kabiraj and Chaudhuri 
(2001) and Chen and Ross (2003).  A large related literature on research joint ventures has 
developed here as well, including papers by Katz (1986), Grossman and Shapiro (1986), 
D’Aspremont et al. (1988), Jorde and Teece (1990) and Kamien et al. (1992).9 
A third, and related, mechanism involves the uses of alliance-like structures to induce the 
sharing of monopoly to deter full-scale entry that would lead to a more competitive duopoly.  
Examples here include Chen and Ross (2000) as well as Gallini’s (1984) examination of 
licensing.   
A fourth mechanism involves the use of alliances to facilitate collusion.  This is a 
common concern expressed, often in informal ways, for example by:  (i)  explaining that alliance 
meetings could be used as a cover for cartel meetings; or (ii) by reference to how cooperating 
with respect to some variables – even if by itself efficient – can lead firms to move toward 
cooperation with respect to other variables, perhaps because a build-up of trust or a culture of 
cooperation.  More formal treatments can be found in Gilo et al. (2006) and Cooper and Ross 
(2009).   
Our contribution here describes a mechanism that, while somewhat related to the first and 
fourth mechanisms above, is novel in important ways.  The creation of a new buffer joint venture 
located between the parents’ locations in product or geographic space means that each parent 
will now compete more directly with the JV than with the other parent.  If the parents can 
cooperate on the setting of the JV’s prices (and other strategic variables), they can use it to soften 
the competition between themselves.  Even if the joint venture is run as an independent profit-
maximizing entity its decisions will be influenced by the interests of its parents and competition 
                                                          
8 See, e.g., Wilkinson and White (2007), Azar et al (forthcoming), O’Brien and Waehrer (2017) and Posner et al 
(2017).  
9 There is also a literature on patent pooling which can have elements of these first two potentially anticompetitive 
effects – horizontal “overlapping ownership” (see Gallini, 2014) when intellectual property (IP)  holders participate 
in the development of a rival product standard, and vertical relationships in which the holders of important IP can 
work together to limit downstream production.  See also Lerner and Tirole (2004) and Lerner et al (2007).  We 
thank Nancy Gallini for drawing our attention to the parallels between some kinds of joint ventures and patent 
pooling agreements. 
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may be softened as a result, as has been described in the common ownership literature.  While 
sharing the idea of common ownership with previous work, the key difference here is that the 
shared-ownership is of an entirely new entity.  While one might expect that the creation of a new 
producer would enhance competition to some degree at least, here we will see that this is not 
necessarily the case – in fact the joint venture can harm competition. 
We also show that the presence of a JV located between its parents has implications for 
the profitability of collusion.  If fixed costs of establishing the JV are low enough, collusion will 
be more profitable with a JV than without it – and, regardless of the level of fixed costs, more 
harmful to consumers.  This is another mechanism, then, through which the presence of a JV 
could support collusion by parents – one that does not derive from the creation of trust or a 
culture of cooperation, nor does it come from influencing equilibrium selection in a game with 
multiple equilibria.10   
Finally, we explore the relative profitability of two collusive strategies parents may 
consider.  We will have seen that JVs – particularly more cooperative ones – can raise two 
parents’ total profits.  But simple collusion by the parents on the pricing of their two products 
can also raise profits.  We show here that establishing a cooperative JV without any explicit 
collusion on parents’ own product prices can be as profitable, and in some cases possibly more 
profitable, as colluding on the two prices.  Importantly, the JV helps generate these profits with a 
(presumably) substantially lower antitrust risk for the parents. 
In its study of the introduction of a new brand into product space, our paper is also 
connected to the literature on filling the product space to deter entry, as famously introduced by 
Schmalensee (1978).  While the motive for using the new product to deter entry does exist in our 
model, we will largely focus on the competition between the parents (and not on entry).11  
 
III.  Model and Benchmark   
To illustrate the effects we want to highlight, we use the simplest possible model that gives us 
firms competing with differentiated products and allows them to place a jointly owned venture 
                                                          
10 As discussed, for example, in Cooper and Ross (2009).  Also, Morasch (2000) examines how parents may be able 
to use an input joint venture to support collusion. In a related way – but again without a new JV entity – Gilo et al 
(2006) study the influence of partial cross-ownership on the potential for tacit collusion. 
11 This is to say that, if entry by a third independent firm were possible, the benefits to the parents of establishing a 
JV will be even greater than what we describe here. 
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(JV) between them in product or geographic space.  That is, the JV will have some of the 
attributes of each parent and will be more similar to the parents than the two parents are similar 
to each other.   
We do this with a model of competition along a Hotelling line with firms/brands located 
in fixed positions at the two ends.  The line is of unit length and buyers are uniformly distributed 
along the line with density M.  Firms have constant marginal costs but incur a fixed, sunk cost of 
F for each brand.  We will further assume that the original fixed costs of the parents have already 
been sunk; they will have no effect (and will be ignored) in the following analysis.  The fixed 
cost associated with establishing the JV will be important, however. Without any further loss of 
generality, we set the marginal cost to zero. 
The utility of a consumer from consuming a unit of good located at distance 𝑑𝑑 is 𝑉𝑉 − 𝑝𝑝 −
𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑.   That is, there is a finite reservation value V for goods of the exact type preferred by 
customers, while the willingness to pay for more distant brands will fall linearly with that 
distance according to the disutility (“transport cost”) parameter t.  We assume that 𝑉𝑉 is 
sufficiently large that the market is covered in all scenarios studied below.  Specifically, we 
assume 𝑉𝑉 ≥ (11/6)𝑡𝑡.12    
Two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2, serve this market.  Initially, each firm produces and sells 
one good.  Let A denote the good produced by Firm 1 and B the good produced by Firm 2.  As 
noted, goods A and B are located at each end of the line, respectively.  
The two firms have the option of setting up a joint venture (Firm J) to produce and sell a 
third good, C.  Let 𝑥𝑥 denote the location of good C on the unit interval. The unit cost of 
production of good C is the same as that of goods A and B.  We assume that 𝑥𝑥 = 0.5, that is, 
Product C is located at the center of the line.13   
                                                          
12 In the standard Hotelling model with two goods, the assumption 𝑉𝑉 ≥ 1.5𝑡𝑡 is sufficient to ensure that the market is 
covered in equilibrium.  Here we assume a higher threshold of 𝑉𝑉 in order to reduce the number of special cases 
(related to narrow ranges in the value of V) we need to analyze.  The analysis of cases under 𝑉𝑉 ≥ �11
6
� 𝑡𝑡 is sufficient 
to demonstrate our ideas about a buffer JV.     
13 For our purposes, we assume the parents place the JV in the middle of the product space though were we to let 
them optimize the location choice other locations might be possible. Our assumption is mostly for convenience – 
other locations will require non-symmetric JV arrangements.  It could also be justified as being the location that 
would be chosen if costs increased in a quadratic fashion with distance; if filling the middle served an additional 
purpose of discouraging entry by an outside firm; or if firms were reluctant to hand over too much sensitive 
information to their rivals for purpose of operating the JV (the middle location suggesting that they are making 
roughly equal sensitive contributions.)  
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In this paper, we are interested in exploring the two firms’ incentives to offer product C 
through a joint venture.  Specifically, Firm 1 and Firm 2 play the following two-stage game: 
        Stage 1: Firms 1 and 2 decide whether they want to form a joint venture (with equal 
ownership shares) to produce good C (located at 𝑥𝑥 = 0.5).    
Stage 2: The firms (all those in the market) choose the prices of their respective products.    
 
Regarding stage 2, we consider both simultaneous price-setting and sequential price-
setting (with the joint venture acting as the price-leader and the parent firms as price-followers). 
We think it is natural to consider a price-leadership version of the model for reasons of both 
motive and opportunity.  As will become clear below, price-leadership by the joint venture is 
profitable for the parents.  And it is not difficult to imagine that the communication between 
parents necessary to implement the JV could take this into account and lead parents to see the 
value in JV price-leadership.  Put another way, the issue of JV price-leadership can be viewed as 
one of the design features contemplated by parent firms.  The policy of following their JV’s lead 
can be seen to be a sort of facilitating practice on the part of parents, likely falling short of 
criminal cartel conduct.   
We use 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 and 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 to denote the price and quantity of good 𝑖𝑖 (= 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶).  The demand 
functions for the three goods can be shown to be: 
𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴 = 𝑀𝑀�14 − 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 − 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶2𝑡𝑡 � ;  𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵 = 𝑀𝑀�14 − 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 − 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶2𝑡𝑡 � ;  𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶 = 𝑀𝑀�12 − 2𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 − 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 − 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵2𝑡𝑡 � .  (1) 
The gross profit generated by product 𝑖𝑖 (i.e. profit before deducting the fixed cost in the 
case of good C) is then 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖.   Let Π𝑖𝑖 denote firm 𝑖𝑖’s  (𝑖𝑖 = 1,2) gross profit .   In the 
scenario where the two firms set up the joint venture, Π1 = 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 + 𝜋𝜋𝐶𝐶 2⁄   and  Π2 = 𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 + 𝜋𝜋𝐶𝐶 2⁄ .  
Otherwise, Π1 = 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 and Π2 = 𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵. 
 
Governance and the Joint Venture’s Objective Function 
One of the key dimensions along which joint ventures can differ – one that is central to 
our analysis here – is the degree to which the JV is run independently of its parents.  In our 
model, this is formalized in the objective function to be maximized by the JV as it sets its price.  
At one extreme, the JV could be run completely independently from its parents such that it 
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selects its price based solely on what maximizes JV profits.  This independence might be the 
result of a free choice by the parents who believe it to be a better way to motivate and monitor 
appointed JV leadership.  Alternatively, independence could be required by competition 
authorities worried about having competitors collaborate too closely.  Below we will refer to 
such as case as involving an “independent JV”. 
 At the other extreme, the JV could be completely controlled by its parents such that its 
price is chosen to maximize its parents’ total profits (i.e. profits from their own products plus the 
JV’s profits).  We call this a “cooperative JV”.   Between these extremes will be cases in which 
JV puts some weight on its parents’ profits, but less weight than on its own profits. 
We model this range of possibilities by assuming that the objective function of the JV 
takes the form Π𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽 = 𝛼𝛼(𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 + 𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵) + 𝜋𝜋𝐶𝐶 , where 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [0, 1]. In other words, the JV’s incentives 
will be to maximize the sum of its own profit and a share of its owners’ profits.  When 𝛼𝛼 = 0 we 
have the case of an independent JV and when  𝛼𝛼 = 1 the case of a fully cooperative JV.  We will 
refer to the case of  0 <  𝛼𝛼 < 1 as one of a “partially cooperative” JV.   
In the analysis that follows we first consider the effects from introducing a new joint 
venture for a given, exogenous, value of 𝛼𝛼.  We then also explore the case of an endogenous 𝛼𝛼, 
chosen by parents to maximize their total profits. While it might appear intuitive that parents 
would choose fully cooperation (i.e. 𝛼𝛼 = 1), we will see that this is not always the case.  Since 
each parent chooses its own price to maximize its profits (including a share of JV profits) even 
with a fully cooperative JV we are not in a fully collusive situation in the market. 
 
Benchmark:  Two-Product Equilibrium 
To assess the effects on prices, profits and welfare measures of the introduction of a JV, 
we first need to establish those values for the pre-JV (“status quo”) comparator benchmark. This 
would also be the equilibrium of the two-stage game if fixed costs were so large as to make a JV 
unprofitable.  That is, consider the equilibrium at status quo, where only good A and good B are 
sold.  The demand functions for these two goods are:14  
                                                          
14 As the techniques for solving these models are very familiar, we are relegating many of the derivations here to the 
Appendix.  
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𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀�12 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗2𝑡𝑡 � , (𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 = 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵, 𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗).         (2) 
In this standard, textbook, model it is straightforward to find the equilibrium prices of the 
two products:  𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂 = 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑂𝑂 = 𝑡𝑡.  The equilibrium profit of each firm (we ignore the sunk fixed costs 
for incumbents) is: 
Π1
𝑂𝑂 = Π2𝑂𝑂 = 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡2 .                 (3) 
Recall that the utility of a consumer from consuming a unit of good located at distance 𝑑𝑑 
is 𝑉𝑉 − 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑.  In this benchmark case where two products are sold at the same price 𝑝𝑝, the 
aggregate consumer surplus is  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑀𝑀 �� [𝑉𝑉 − 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡]𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0.5
0
+ � [𝑉𝑉 − 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝑡𝑡)]𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡1
0.5 � = 𝑀𝑀�𝑉𝑉 − 𝑡𝑡4 − 𝑝𝑝� .        (4) 
Given the equilibrium prices above, consumer surplus here will be: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂 = 𝑀𝑀 �𝑉𝑉 − 54 𝑡𝑡� .                            (5) 
Our measure of social welfare is the standard total surplus (consumer surplus plus firm profits) and we 
use these terms interchangeably. In this benchmark case, we sum profits from (3) and consumer surplus 
from (5) to obtain:  
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂 = 𝑀𝑀�𝑉𝑉 − 𝑡𝑡4� .                              (6) 
 
IV.  Joint Venture with Simultaneous Price-Setting 
As described above the model has two versions in terms of whether the joint venture sets its 
prices at the same time as its parents or whether (as part of the JV agreement perhaps) the JV is a 
price leader.  In this section, we consider the scenario in which the joint venture chooses its price 
at the same time as its parent firms, and we will analyze price leadership in the next section.  
It is important to recognize that, in this section and the next, the parents will always be 
assumed to be setting their own product prices non-cooperatively (though internalizing effects on 
12 
 
their shares of JV profits).15 This means each parent may find it profitable to undercut the price 
of the JV sufficiently to take over its whole market share.  As the JV is in the center of the space 
between them, it is conceivable that a parent may wish to set a price so low that it steals all the 
JV’s market share and then finds itself competing on the margin with the other parent.  As 
observed below, this indeed occurs if the price of the JV exceeds a certain threshold and this will 
have an effect on the equilibrium.   
To analyze the scenario in which the joint venture chooses its price at the same time as its 
parent firms, we use (1) to write the objective function of each parent firm as:  
Π𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 + 𝜋𝜋𝐶𝐶2 = 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 �14 − 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 − 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶2𝑡𝑡 �𝑀𝑀 + (𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶/2) �12 − 2𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 − 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 − 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘2𝑡𝑡 �𝑀𝑀   (7) 
where (𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗, 𝑘𝑘) = (1,𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵) and (2,𝐵𝐵,𝐴𝐴).  Maximizing (7) for each parent firm, we find their best-
response functions:  
𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 = 𝑡𝑡 + 3𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶4 .                       (8) 
𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 = 𝑡𝑡 + 3𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶4 .               (9) 
Eq. (8) and (9) prescribe the prices of the parent firms as continuous functions of the JV’s 
price 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶.  In fact, however, there will be a discontinuity in the demand functions for products A 
and B as functions of the price of C.  If 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 is high enough, while small price cuts below the 
levels given in (8) and (9) remain unprofitable, larger price cuts that take over the JV’s whole 
market share will be profitable.  As is shown in the appendix, (8) and (9) represent the parent 
firms’ best responses only if 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 ≤  �53� 𝑡𝑡.  When 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 exceeds �53� 𝑡𝑡,  a parent firm will in fact find 
it profitable to deviate from (8)-(9) and cut its price by an amount large enough to take over all 
the JV’s sales.  We will refer to such a response by a parent firm as a discrete or drastic price 
deviation.  
With this in mind, we solve the JV’s optimization problem at stage 2: 
                                                          
15 Section VI considers the case in which parents set their product prices cooperatively. 
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max𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶  Π𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽 = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 �14 − 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 − 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶2𝑡𝑡 �𝑀𝑀 + 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 �14 − 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 − 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶2𝑡𝑡 �𝑀𝑀+ 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 �12 − 2𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 − 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 − 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵2𝑡𝑡 �𝑀𝑀,                 (10) 
to find the JV’s best-response function:  
𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 = 𝑡𝑡 + (1 + 𝛼𝛼)𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 + (1 + 𝛼𝛼)𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵4 .             (11) 
Solving the equation system of (8), (9) and (11), we derive the equilibrium prices at stage 
2 (for a fixed 𝛼𝛼):  
𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 = 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 = 7𝑡𝑡2(5 − 3𝛼𝛼) ,𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 = (3 + 𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡(5 − 3𝛼𝛼).   (12) 
Recalling that (8) and (9) are applicable as long as 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 ≤  �53� 𝑡𝑡, we use (12) to find that the latter 
implies 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 8 9⁄ .  In other words, (12) gives the equilibrium prices at stage 2 for 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [0, 8 9⁄ ].  
There are a number observations we can make based on (12) and comparisons with the 
results from the benchmark case.   We will see that several of the qualitative effects on prices, 
quantities and profits will depend on whether or not α is above or below ½.16 
First, from (12), it is straightforward to show that equilibrium prices in this range are 
such that 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼⁄ > 0.  In words, a larger 𝛼𝛼  (i.e. more cooperative JV) leads to higher prices for 
all three goods.  
Comparing price levels to those prior to the JV:  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 < 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 if 𝛼𝛼 < 1/2 and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 if 𝛼𝛼 ∈[1/2, 8 9⁄ ] where 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 = 𝑡𝑡 is the equilibrium price in the two-good benchmark.  That is, when the 
JV is more independent (𝛼𝛼 < 1/2), introducing the JV is a net stimulus to price competition.17 
Since each parent only claims half of the profits of the JV, it does represent some level of new 
and closer competition. However, the incentive to cut prices on the parent’s own products is 
dulled by the fact of partial ownership of this new rival.  With low values of α, the net effect is to 
                                                          
16 The case in which α=1/2 corresponds to what O’Brien and Salop (2000, p. 583) referred to, in a slightly different 
context, as “proportional control” – where the JV (in our case) makes pricing decisions taking into account the 
profits of each shareholder in proportion to their ownership of the JV. 
17 Though prices will not be as low as in the case of entry by an independent third firm, when price would fall to t/2 
for all three products.  See the Appendix.  
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depress price.  When the JV is more cooperative, however, (𝑖𝑖. 𝑒𝑒.  𝛼𝛼 > 1/2), prices will rise 
relative to the pre-JV situation. 
If 𝛼𝛼 > 8 9⁄ , on the other hand, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium at stage 2.  To 
illustrate this, consider the special case where 𝛼𝛼 = 1.  Setting 𝛼𝛼 = 1 in (12), we find that 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 =
𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 = �47� 𝑡𝑡 and  𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 = 2𝑡𝑡.  Given such a high 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 and the price of the other parent firm, firm 𝑖𝑖  will 
engage in a drastic price deviation to steal the entire market share from the JV. Since both 
parents have this incentive to drastically cut their prices, they bypass the JV on the product line 
and compete with each other directly, causing the prices of goods A and B to fall towards the 
equilibrium prices of two-good benchmark (𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂 = 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑂𝑂 = 𝑡𝑡).  On the other hand, the JV will 
respond by lowering its price to 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  �53� 𝑡𝑡 in an attempt to capture a positive market share.  
Facing this lower 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶, the parents will raise their prices as per their best-response functions (8) 
and (9).  But given these prices of goods A and B, the JV’s best response is to raise 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 above 
�
5
3
� 𝑡𝑡 .  As a result, only a mixed-strategy equilibrium is possible in this case.     
Returning to the case 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 8 9⁄ , we substitute (12) into (1) to find the equilibrium 
quantities 
𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴 = 𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵 = (4 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑀𝑀4(5 − 3𝛼𝛼) ,𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶 = (6 − 5𝛼𝛼)𝑀𝑀2(5 − 3𝛼𝛼) .    (13) 
Note that, in this model, the quantities translate easily into market shares: setting 𝑀𝑀 = 1 in (13) 
reveals the market shares of each product. Different values of α will lead to different relevant 
market shares of the JV compared to its parents.  Specifically:  𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴 𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼⁄ = 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵 𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼⁄ > 0 and 
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶 𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼⁄ < 0.  In words, when the JV is more cooperative, it sells less and its parents sell more.  
When α = ½ the JV is exactly twice as large as each of its parents. 
Using (12) and (13), we obtain the equilibrium profit of a parent firm in this case:  
Π𝑖𝑖 −
𝐹𝐹2 = (64 − 25𝛼𝛼 − 10𝛼𝛼2)𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡8(5 − 3𝛼𝛼)2 − 𝐹𝐹2 ,         (𝑖𝑖 = 1,2).   (14) 
Not surprisingly, more cooperative JVs are more profitable for their parents:  𝜕𝜕(Π1 + Π2) 𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼⁄ >0 for all 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 8 9⁄ ; that is, a larger 𝛼𝛼 raises the joint profits as long as firms do not engage in 
drastic price deviations.  It does this primarily by effecting the JV’s pricing decisions.  Clearly, 
different levels of α do not really effect the incentives of parents to cut prices to steal sales from 
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the JV.  However, the more cooperative the JV is (i.e. the larger is α) the more “buffered” its 
competition with its parents is from its side:  the extra profits the JV might earn through lowering 
prices and stealing market share from its parents need to be balanced against the harm done to its 
parents’ profits which matter to the JV more when α is larger. 
Comparing again with the pre-JV case, we see that the JV does not necessarily raise its 
parents’ profits.  At 𝛼𝛼 = 1/2, Π1 + Π2 = Π1𝑂𝑂 + Π2𝑂𝑂, where Π1𝑂𝑂 + Π2𝑂𝑂 = 𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 is the level of joint 
profits in the two-good benchmark. Hence, once we consider the fixed costs of setting up the JV, 
we see immediately that this JV will never be profitable for its parents when 𝛼𝛼 < 1/2  and can 
only be profitable when 𝛼𝛼 > 1/2, if the higher levels of profits before fixed costs (Π𝑖𝑖 − Π𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂) are 
large enough to offset the (shared) fixed costs, i.e. if  Π𝑖𝑖 − Π𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 > 𝐹𝐹 2⁄ .18  
We are now in a position to determine the conditions under which the firms will choose 
to establish a JV.19 
 
Proposition 1: Assume all firms choose prices simultaneously.  For a given level 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [0, 8 9⁄ ], 
Firm 1 and Firm 2 will find it profitable  to set up a  joint venture if  
 
𝐹𝐹 < (2𝛼𝛼 − 1)(36 − 23𝛼𝛼)𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡4(5 − 3𝛼𝛼)2 .          
 
This condition requires a low enough level of fixed costs and a high enough level of cooperative 
behavior (α) by the JV for the JV to be profitable for the parents.  For example, as noted above, 
even if fixed costs were zero, the value of α would have to be great than ½ for this to be satisfied.  
                                                          
18 It is straightforward to show that a third firm, if not prevented by factors outside our model (e.g. intellectual 
property protections) would find it profitable to enter this market if F<Mt/4.  It can also be shown that if fixed costs 
are this low, it would be more profitable for the parents to create a JV as a blocking strategy – even a fully 
independent JV will yield greater profits for parents than they would receive if there was new entry.  These are  
demonstrated in the Appendix where, as a further benchmark, the implications for prices, profits and welfare of 
entry by an independent third firm are developed.  Importantly, behaviors of the sort described by Schmalensee 
(1978) would be present here if new entry were permitted.  
19 Proofs of all propositions are contained in the Appendix. 
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The maximum value α can take without leading to mixed strategies (i.e. α = 8/9) would allow for 
profitable JVs as long as F ≤ (5/11)Mt. 20 
Next, we consider the welfare consequences of JV under the assumption that 𝛼𝛼 ∈[0, 8 9⁄ ].  To express the welfare measures in the situation where three goods are sold in 
equilibrium, let 𝑡𝑡� denote the location of the consumer who is indifferent between good A and 
good C, and 𝑡𝑡� the location of the consumer indifferent between good B and good C.  The 
aggregate consumer surplus can be expressed as 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶′ = 𝑀𝑀 �𝑉𝑉 − 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡� − 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵�1 − 𝑡𝑡�� − 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶�𝑡𝑡� − 𝑡𝑡�� − 𝑡𝑡2𝑡𝑡�2 − 𝑡𝑡2 �1 − 𝑡𝑡��2 − 𝑡𝑡2 (12 − 𝑡𝑡�)2
−
𝑡𝑡2 (𝑡𝑡� − 12)2� .             (15) 
The total surplus associated with this case is:  
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶′ = 𝑀𝑀 �𝑉𝑉 − 𝑡𝑡2𝑡𝑡�2 − 𝑡𝑡2 �1 − 𝑡𝑡��2 − 𝑡𝑡2 (12 − 𝑡𝑡�)2 − 𝑡𝑡2 (𝑡𝑡� − 12)2� − 𝐹𝐹.                 (16) 
We substitute the equilibrium values of 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖, 𝑡𝑡�, and 𝑡𝑡�  into (15) and (16) to obtain the 
equilibrium levels of consumer welfare and total welfare.  First, for consumer surplus we have: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑀𝑀 �𝑉𝑉 − (154 − 84𝛼𝛼 − 7𝛼𝛼2)8(5 − 3𝛼𝛼)2 𝑡𝑡� ,   (17) 
 
It is easy to see that consumer surplus decreases monotonically as α increases: i.e.  𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼⁄ < 0.  
This should not be surprising as we have already seen that prices rise with α.   
However, compared to the two-product benchmark there are two effects on consumer 
surplus that work in opposite directions.  The higher prices under the JV is one effect, but there is 
also now a new product with the associated reduced transportation costs.  Taking these together 
and working with (17) we can show that 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 > 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂 if 𝛼𝛼 < (108 − 28√3)/97(≈ 0.613), and 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂 otherwise. Recall that the JV is potentially profitable (for 𝐹𝐹 small enough) if 𝛼𝛼 >
                                                          
20 Notice that this level of F is much higher than the critical level at which a new entrant would chose to move into 
the space (see footnote 18), indicating that buffering JVs may arise under a wider set of parameters than simple 
entry-blocking JVs. 
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1 2⁄ , in part because it will increase prices above that level.   Hence, for 𝛼𝛼 ∈ (0.5, 0.613) the JV 
improves consumer welfare and is potentially profitable. In words, as long as α is not too large, 
the consumer benefits of having more products (and reduced transportation costs) are greater 
than the losses suffered from higher JV prices.   
These results allow us to establish the following: 
 
Proposition 2:  Under simultaneous price-setting, and considering the range 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [0, 8 9⁄ ], a JV 
improves consumer welfare if it is sufficiently independent (i.e. approximately: 𝛼𝛼 <0.613)  and reduces consumer welfare otherwise.   
 
In terms of total surplus, we find: 
 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 = 𝑀𝑀 �𝑉𝑉 − (26 − 34𝛼𝛼 + 13𝛼𝛼2)8(5 − 3𝛼𝛼)2 𝑡𝑡� − 𝐹𝐹.           (18) 
 
Our assumption on a lower bound for V (V ≥ (11/6)t) guarantees that, in all cases we consider, 
the market will be covered (all potential buyers will buy some product).  Combined with the 0-1 
nature of demand this means that total surplus will be determined by the amount of 
transportation cost incurred by buyers and not by price levels. For a given number of products at 
set locations, total transportation costs will be minimized when all prices are the same – identical 
prices imply that everyone will buy from the closest product and this will minimize 
transportation costs.  From (18) we can see that 𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼⁄ > 0 if 𝛼𝛼 < 1 2⁄ , and 𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼⁄ < 0 if 
𝛼𝛼 > 1 2⁄ .  These relationships are explained by the fact that prices are equal when α = ½ and 
become more different the further α gets from ½.  
Following this, 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 achieves its maximum at 𝛼𝛼 = 1 2⁄ .  Its minimum is at 𝛼𝛼 = 8/9. For 𝛼𝛼 
in this range, the JV improves total surplus if 𝐹𝐹 is small enough.  This leads to: 
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Proposition 3:  Assume all firms choose prices simultaneously and consider the range 𝛼𝛼 ∈[0, 8 9⁄ ].  The impact of a JV on total surplus depends on the magnitude of F.  
Specifically, the JV will raise total surplus if  
 
𝐹𝐹 < (6 − 5𝛼𝛼)(4 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡8(5 − 3𝛼𝛼)2  
 
For example, in the case of an independent JV (α = 0) we would need F < (3/25)Mt for the JV to 
raise total surplus.  The critical F would be a little higher when α = ½ and prices are equalized, 
that is we would need F < Mt/8 for total surplus to increase.  When α = 8/9, the critical F is at its 
lowest, F < Mt/9.  
 
Again, Proposition 3 reflects the impact of two opposing forces on total surplus.  First, 
the additional product introduced with the JV reduces average transportation costs for 
consumers.  However, this gain in social welfare can be overwhelmed by the additional fixed 
cost if the latter is too large. 
Consider now the implications of allowing the players to structure the JV governance as 
they see fit.  Suppose that Firm 1 and Firm 2 actually select their parameter, α, at stage 1 when 
they decide to set up the JV.  Clearly, they will choose a value of 𝛼𝛼 that maximizes their profits.  
From (14), we can see that the profit of each parent firm rises with 𝛼𝛼 in the range [0, 8/9].  
Hence, they would choose 𝛼𝛼 = 8 9⁄  as long as the profit is higher at this value of 𝛼𝛼 than that in a 
mixed-strategy equilibrium that would prevail if 𝛼𝛼 > 8 9⁄ .  The latter, as shown in the Appendix, 
is indeed true.21   
 
Proposition 4:  Assume all firms will choose prices simultaneously.  If Firm 1 and Firm 2 can 
chose the level of α to be used in the JV’s objective function, they will set up a JV with α 
= 8/9 as long as F < (5/9)Mt.   With such a JV, consumer surplus is reduced relative to 
                                                          
21 It is perhaps not surprising that a mixed-strategy equilibrium would generate a smaller profit.  When 𝛼𝛼 > 8 9⁄ , the 
JV has an incentive to raise its price to such a high level that makes itself vulnerable to drastic price cuts by the 
parent firms.  In a mixed-strategy equilibrium, a parent firm indeed undercuts and steals the whole market share 
from the JV with some probability.  This makes a mixed-strategy equilibrium less profitable than the most profitable 
pure-strategy equilibrium (which occurs at 𝛼𝛼 = 8 9⁄ ).    
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the two-product benchmark.  Total surplus relative to the two-product benchmark, will 
also decrease unless fixed costs are such that F ≤ Mt/9.   
 
 In this section, we have seen the potential for JVs to reduce competition between parents 
to the point of harming consumers and reducing total surplus, even though they introduce a new 
product into the market.  Partners who argue to competition authorities that their JV must be 
good for consumers because it involves the introduction of a new product are telling only part of 
the story of the JV’s effect on the market.  Of course, we have also seen that JVs can, under 
some circumstances – particularly when operated independently from their parents – improve 
consumer welfare and raise total surplus.   
 The next section asks the same set of questions about the effects of the introduction of a 
new JV, but for the case in which the parents agree to let the JV be a price leader in the market.   
 
V.  Joint Venture as Price Leader 
We now turn to the case in which the JV is a price leader in the market.  It would seem 
reasonable to believe that the parents, in coming together to create the JV might also come to an 
understanding that they will follow the pricing lead of their JV.  As we show, it is in fact 
profitable for them to adopt this behavior. 
In this scenario, the JV chooses the price of good C before the parent firms set the prices 
of goods A and B.  Accordingly, the JV maximizes its objective function given in (10) subject to 
the parent firms’ reaction functions, (8) and (9).  Solving this optimization problem, we find: 
𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 = 2(3 + 𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡(4 − 3𝛼𝛼) .    (19)   
Substituting the above into (8) and (9) gives us 
𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 = 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 = (22 + 3𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡4(4 − 3𝛼𝛼) .    (20) 
Recall that (8) and (9) are applicable only for 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 ≤  �53� 𝑡𝑡.  Imposing this restriction on 
(19), we find that 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 2 21⁄ (≈ 0.095). In other words, (19) and (20) give the equilibrium prices 
for 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [0, 2 21]⁄ . 
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If 𝛼𝛼 > 2 21⁄ , on the other hand, (19) would imply 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 >  �53� 𝑡𝑡.  Given such a high 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶, 
each parent will engage in a drastic deviation in an attempt to capture the JV’s entire market 
share.  But as both parents do this, they end up competing directly against each other, leading to 
the same equilibrium prices and quantities as in the two-good benchmark.  Anticipating this, the 
JV -- now a price leader -- will choose 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  �53� 𝑡𝑡, the highest price without inducing drastic 
price deviations.  This leads the parents to choose 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 = 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 = �32� 𝑡𝑡 as per (8)-(9).  These then are 
the equilibrium prices in the case 𝛼𝛼 ≥ 2 21⁄ .   Notice, that putting the JV into the price 
leadership position avoids the need to consider mixed strategies as we had to with simultaneous 
price-setting and values of 𝛼𝛼 approaching one.   
Comparing the prices in (19) and (20) with those in the two-product benchmark, we can 
see that all prices are higher with the JV: 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 > 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 for all 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [0, 2 21⁄ ].  Moreover, the more 
cooperative the JV, the higher all three prices will be up to point at which higher JV prices would 
trigger drastic price cuts from parents, i.e. 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼⁄ > 0 ∀𝑖𝑖, in the range 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [0, 2 21⁄ ].  For 
values of 𝛼𝛼 >  2 21⁄ , all prices will stay at the constrained levels (𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  �53� 𝑡𝑡, 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 = 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 = �32� 𝑡𝑡).  
Note that these prices of goods A and B are higher than those in the two-product benchmark. 
Returning to the case 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 2 21⁄ , we substitute (19) and (20) into (1) to find the 
equilibrium quantities: 
𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴 = 𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵 = (10 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑀𝑀8(4 − 3𝛼𝛼) ,        𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶 = (6 − 11𝛼𝛼)𝑀𝑀4(4 − 3𝛼𝛼) .      (21) 
Over the range in which increasing 𝛼𝛼 changes prices, more cooperate JVs will result in 
larger market shares for the parents and a smaller market share for the JV: 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴 𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼⁄ =
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵 𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼⁄ > 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶 𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼⁄ < 0 for all 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [0, 2 21⁄ ].  For independent JVs (α = 0), the JV will 
itself have 3/8 of the market sales while each parent will have 5/16 shares.  When JVs are more 
cooperative, to the point that  α = 2/21 or above, each product (the JV’s included) will have a 1/3 
market share. 
Using (19)-(21), we obtain a parent firm’s profit: 
Π𝑖𝑖 −
𝐹𝐹2 = (364 − 208𝛼𝛼 − 91𝛼𝛼2)𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡32(4 − 3𝛼𝛼)2 − 𝐹𝐹2 , (𝑖𝑖 = 1,2).      (22) 
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Profits of both parents rise if the JV is more cooperative, up to the point where prices stop 
changing (i.e. once 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  �53� 𝑡𝑡):  i.e. 𝜕𝜕Π𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼⁄ > 0 for 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 2 21⁄ .  
For all values of 𝛼𝛼, gross profits before considering fixed costs are higher with the JV 
than in the two-product benchmark, i.e.  Π𝑖𝑖 > Π𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 for all 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [0,1]. Hence, setting up this type of 
JV is always profitable for a small enough 𝐹𝐹, i.e., if 𝐹𝐹/2 <  Π𝑖𝑖 − Π𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂. This leads to the 
following: 
 
Proposition 5: Assume the joint venture sets its price before the parent firms select theirs.  For a 
given level of 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [0, 2/21], Firm 1 and Firm 2 will find it profitable  to set up a  joint 
venture if  
𝐹𝐹 < (108 + 176𝛼𝛼 − 235𝛼𝛼2)𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡16(4 − 3𝛼𝛼)2 .       
For 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [2 21⁄ , 1], the JV raises total surplus if 𝐹𝐹 < �5
9
�𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡.     
 
Notice that this is a weaker condition than that for the simultaneous price-setting case.  To see 
this notice that, whereas no JV with α < ½ could be profitable in the simultaneous case, now 
even if the JV is fully independent (α=0), it can be profitable if F < (27/64)Mt.   
Compared with the JV under simultaneous price-setting, the price-leadership JV achieves 
the same level of equilibrium profit with a much smaller 𝛼𝛼 (2/21 rather than 8/9).  Firms may 
prefer this type of JV if a larger 𝛼𝛼 attracts the scrutiny of competition authorities. Reinforcing 
this point, note that the firms can achieve the same levels of prices and profits with an 
independent (𝛼𝛼 = 0) price-leadership JV as those under a simultaneous price-setting JV with 
𝛼𝛼 = 9 11⁄ (≈ 0.818). 
Again, we substitute the equilibrium values of 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖, 𝑡𝑡�, and 𝑡𝑡�  into (15) and (16) to obtain 
the levels of consumer welfare and total surplus for 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [0, 2 21⁄ ].  For consumer surplus we 
have:   
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑀𝑀 �𝑉𝑉 − (796 − 492𝛼𝛼 − 121𝛼𝛼2)32(4 − 3𝛼𝛼)2 𝑡𝑡� .   (23) 
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The more cooperative the JV, the lower the level of consumer surplus:  i.e. 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼⁄ < 0 up to 
𝛼𝛼 = 2 21⁄  (then CS does not change further for higher levels of α).  And, for any level of 
cooperativeness in the JV, consumer surplus with the JV is lower than consumer surplus with in 
the two-product benchmark; i.e. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 < 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂 for all 𝛼𝛼 ≥ 0.  These observations give us: 
 
Proposition 6:   If the joint venture acts as a price leader, consumer welfare falls with the 
establishment of a JV for all values of α.  
Price leadership by the JV leads to higher prices for all products, sufficiently higher to 
outweigh any benefit to consumers from reduced distance to their preferred product.  Prices are 
highest when the JV is fully cooperative. 
For total surplus, the expression becomes: 
 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 = 𝑀𝑀 �𝑉𝑉 − (68 − 76𝛼𝛼 + 61𝛼𝛼2)32(4 − 3𝛼𝛼)2 𝑡𝑡� − 𝐹𝐹.   (24) 
 
Here we can see that the more cooperative the JV, the lower the level of total surplus; i.e. 
𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼⁄ < 0.  Total surplus is the highest at 𝛼𝛼 = 0 and the lowest at 𝛼𝛼 = 2 21⁄  and above.  
Whether any JV can increase total surplus under price leadership will again depend on the level 
of fixed costs.   
 
Proposition 7:  Assume the joint venture acts as a price leader.  A joint venture will increase 
total surplus if fixed costs are low enough, specifically if, for 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [0, 2 21⁄ ):  
𝐹𝐹 < (60 − 116𝛼𝛼 + 11𝛼𝛼2)𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡32(4 − 3𝛼𝛼)2 . 
For 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [2 21⁄ , 1], the JV raises total surplus if 𝐹𝐹 < 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 9⁄ .     
 
As we did in the previous case, we can consider the implications of allowing the players 
to structure the JV governance as they see fit.  If we allow the JV partners to actually select their 
parameter, α, it is clear from the above what they will do.  At 𝛼𝛼 = 2/21, Π𝑖𝑖 = (79)𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡; it is the 
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highest level of gross profit that a parent firm can achieve with this JV (before attracting drastic 
price deviations).  Therefore, in the equilibrium of the whole game, 𝛼𝛼 = 2/21, Π1 = Π2 =(7
9
)𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡, and setting up the JV is profitable if 𝐹𝐹 < (5/9)𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡. 
 
Proposition 8:  Assume the JV acts as a price leader.  If Firm 1 and Firm 2 can chose the level of 
α to be used in the JV’s objective function, they will set up a JV with  α ≥ 2/21 as long as 
F < (5/9)Mt.  With this choice, relative to the two-product benchmark, consumer surplus 
is reduced.  Total surplus relative to the two-product benchmark, will also decrease 
unless fixed costs are such that  F ≤ Mt/9.   
 
 We can see the profitability of price leadership by comparing the profits in the 
simultaneous move case (14) with those from the price leadership case here (22).   
 
Proposition 9:  The combined profits of the parents under JV price leadership are weakly higher, 
for all values of α, than combined profits with a JV under simultaneous price-setting and 
are strictly higher for all values of α < 8/9.   
 
Not surprisingly, price leadership, by pulling prices further up, increases profits for all values of 
the α parameter.   Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between per-parent profits  and the 
parameter α, for the simultaneous move and price-leadership cases.  We can see there that only at 
the level  α= 8/9 are profits the same in both cases. 
 Similarly, we can, compare the levels of consumer surplus and total surplus under 
simultaneous choices and price leadership.  For consumer surplus this involves comparing levels 
from (17) and (23).  For total surplus we need to compare the levels given by (18) and (24). 
 
Proposition 10:  For values of α in the range  𝛼𝛼 ∈ [0, 8/9)   consumer surplus and total surplus 
are strictly lower in the JV price leadership case than when all firms set prices 
simultaneously.  When α = 8/9, consumer surplus is the same in the two cases as is total 
surplus.   
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Figure 2 illustrates the values taken by these surplus functions for different values of α separately 
for the simultaneous and price leadership cases.22  Combining these results we see that both the 
sequencing of moves and the level of cooperativeness (α) in the JV influence its effects.  In brief 
terms, JV price leadership and more cooperative JVs are more profitable but also more harmful 
to consumers and total surplus.   
 
VI.  JVs and Collusion 
In the analysis above, we assumed that while the parent firms cooperated in establishing the joint 
venture and in setting its price, their pricing behavior with respect their original products was 
strictly non-cooperative.  In fact, our main interest was in how the JV could serve to buffer this 
competition and lead to higher profits. 
It is natural, however, to be concerned that competitors that meet to form joint ventures 
might agree to cooperate in other dimensions. In this section we want to explore the profitability 
of collusion with and without a JV to see if JVs can raise the gains to collusion and to assess the 
consequences for consumers and total welfare of collusion with and without JVs.23  
There has long been a concern in antitrust circles that cooperation of firms in one arena 
(e.g. in setting up a JV) could spill over into reduced competition in markets in which they are 
expected to compete.24  Various mechanisms generating this spillover have been hypothesized, 
including improved information flows between colluding firms, the cover of cartel meetings 
provided by the need to meet to discuss legitimate cooperation, the use of a JV as a vehicle for 
the punishment of defectors, and simply the building of trust through working together.   
In this section we allow the parents to cooperatively set their two prices in the two-
product benchmark and then all three prices when they have established their joint venture. 
Collusion with its associated total profit maximization then replaces the different governance 
structures (i.e. α.) we considered above.     
 
Collusion without a JV 
                                                          
22 To clearly illustrate the differences between these curves, the scales on the two panels are different (so the heights 
of curves are not comparable across panels).     
23 The question of whether the presence of a JV will affect the stability of collusion is beyond the scope of our static 
model here, but is one we are exploring in further work.   
24 For example, see Cooper and Ross (2009) and the literature cited therein. 
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Consider first collusion by the two firms when there is no joint venture.  It can easily be shown 
that the cartel will set the price such that the cartel extracts the entire surplus of the consumer in 
the middle of the line:  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂 = 𝑉𝑉 −  𝑡𝑡/2  As noted, given the assumption 𝑉𝑉 ≥ (116 )𝑡𝑡, the firms will 
not raise prices any higher (which would lead to a portion of the market not covered).    
The collusive profit of firm 𝑖𝑖 (= 1,2) in this scenario is:  Π𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂 = 𝑀𝑀4 (2𝑉𝑉 − 𝑡𝑡),                    (25) 
where superscript 𝐶𝐶 indicates collusion (or cartel) and 𝑂𝑂 indicates the original benchmark case of 
two products.    
 
Collusion with a Joint Venture 
Consider now a situation in which the firms set up a JV to produce good C located in the middle 
of the line and then decide whether to collude.25  Colluding firms will choose the prices of all 
three goods to maximize their joint profit.  Accordingly, the resulting collusive prices are 
independent of the governance form of the JV—in effect JV governance has been supplanted by 
cartel governance.    
It is straightforward to show that, given 𝑉𝑉 ≥ (11
6
)𝑡𝑡, the three-product cartel also has no 
incentive to raise the prices to the point where a portion of the market is not covered.  Instead, it 
will set the prices of the three goods such that the marginal consumer between any pair of goods 
pays a delivered price equal to the consumer’s willingness to pay, 𝑉𝑉.  This will involve identical 
prices for the three products.  The collusive prices and quantities are: 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝐶𝐶𝐽𝐽 = 𝑉𝑉 − 14 𝑡𝑡;  𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐽𝐽 = 𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐽𝐽 = 14𝑀𝑀,𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐽𝐽 = 12𝑀𝑀.               (26) 
Before deducting the fixed cost of establishing the JV, the collusive profit of each parent is:  
Π1
𝐶𝐶𝐽𝐽 = Π2𝐶𝐶𝐽𝐽 = 12𝑀𝑀�𝑉𝑉 − 14 𝑡𝑡� .               (27) 
 
Comparison of Collusion with and without a JV 
                                                          
25 While, as above, we will simply assume that the JV is located in the middle of the line, it can be shown that it will 
be profit maximizing for the colluding firms to locate it there.  
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Here we investigate the effects of JV on the profitability, consumer surplus and total welfare 
effects of collusion by comparing the cartel equilibrium in the presence of JV with that in the 
absence of JV.  First, we examine the profitability of collusion.  A comparison of Π𝑖𝑖
𝐶𝐶𝐽𝐽 − 0.5𝐹𝐹 
with Π𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂 reveals 
 
Proposition 11: Collusion with a JV is more profitable than collusion without a JV if, and only 
if, 𝐹𝐹 < 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 4⁄ . 
 
This conditional result should not be surprising.  Since the cartel price is pushed up to the 
level at which the customer most distant is indifferent about consuming, it is effectively 
constrained by distance and transportation costs.  Putting another product in the middle of the 
space reduces those costs, allowing room for the cartel to raise prices further.  However this 
comes at the cost of introducing the new product, F.  If F is too large, in this case if 𝐹𝐹 > 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 4⁄ , 
the higher prices do not justify introducing the JV.26     
Next, we compare the welfare levels of collusion with and without a JV.  If the two firms 
collude without using a JV, the level of consumer welfare is: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂 = 14𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡.                  (28) 
The level of total surplus is the same as in (6), as the market remains covered and transportation 
costs are unchanged. 
If the firms collude in the presence of a buffer JV, the levels of consumer and total 
surplus are: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐽𝐽 = 18𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡.             (29) 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐽𝐽 = 𝑀𝑀 �𝑉𝑉 − 18 𝑡𝑡� − 𝐹𝐹.     (30)        
 
Comparing (29)-(30) with (28) and (6), leads to the following:   
 
Proposition 12:  For consumers, collusion with a JV is worse than collusion without JV. 
                                                          
26 Recall (from footnote 18) that 𝐹𝐹 < 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 4⁄  is also the condition that would make entry by an independent third firm 
profitable (absent collusion).  
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While consumers benefit from reduced transportation costs with the JV, they are hurt by the 
higher prices they face.  On balance here they are made worse off by the introduction of the JV. 
 
Proposition 13:  Collusion with a JV is better for total surplus than collusion without a JV if and 
only if 𝐹𝐹 < 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 8⁄ .27   
 
Summarizing, we have seen that buffer JVs can have significant implications for the 
effects of collusion in our model.  Specifically we have found that:   
(i) for low levels of the fixed cost, collusion with a JV will be more profitable than 
collusion without the JV;  
(ii) collusion with a JV is always worse for consumers than collusion without a JV;  and  
(iii) relative welfare under collusion with a JV compared to collusion without a JV 
depends on the magnitude of fixed costs:  for low values of F, collusion with the JV is 
better for total surplus than collusion with no JV, but the reverse is true for higher 
levels of fixed costs. 
 
Joint Ventures vs. Collusion as Alternative Strategies  
We have seen in our non-cooperative game that JVs can reduce competition and raise parents’ 
profits.  Of course, collusion can do this too.   A final question of some interest then, is whether a 
JV is a good substitute strategy for parents contemplating collusion.  Consider two parents 
choosing between collusion (without a JV) and a price-leading cooperative JV with 𝛼𝛼 ∈[2 21⁄ , 1]  (the most profitable case in our static setting).  While it might not achieve the same 
level of prices and it will involve incurring an additional fixed cost, the JV may avoid legal risks 
associated with cartel conduct.   
A full analysis of this case would require a model with antitrust enforcement, which is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  However, we can at least see how close the JV profits will be to 
the full collusive profits.  Recall that the most profitable JV equilibrium occurs at prices 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 =
                                                          
27 It can easily be shown that 𝐹𝐹 < 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 8⁄    is also the condition for entry by an independent third firm to be total 
surplus increasing (absent collusion). An implication of this proposition is that, when fixed costs are great enough 
that new entry is not a concern (i.e,.  𝐹𝐹 > 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 4⁄ ), a JV aggravates the total surplus loss from collusion.     
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𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 =  �32� 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 = �53� 𝑡𝑡.  Comparing the gross profit (before deducting the fixed cost of the 
JV) at these prices with the two-good collusive profit given in (25), we obtain the following 
result.   
 
Proposition 14. A price-leading cooperative JV with 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [2 21⁄ , 1] generates a larger gross 
profit for the two firms than collusion with two products if 𝑉𝑉 ∈ (�11
6
� 𝑡𝑡, �37
18
� 𝑡𝑡). The 
opposite is true if 𝑉𝑉 >  �37
18
� 𝑡𝑡.   
 
Collusion does allow for higher prices, but for lower values of V the possible increases 
are not as large.  Introducing the JV does require new expenditures on fixed costs, but provides 
more freedom to raise prices by reducing transportation costs.   Interestingly, the JV can be a 
more profitable route to higher profits than two-product collusion.  On top of this, the JV might 
bring with it a lower antitrust risk for the parents.   
 
VII.  Policy Implications and Conclusions 
In this paper we have described a new mechanism through which certain kinds of strategic 
alliances or joint ventures can threaten competition.  The key idea is that a new entity, jointly 
owned, placed between two parents in product (or geographic) space can serve to buffer the 
competition between the parents.  Now each parent, for at least some of its customers, is 
competing with the JV -- which it owns jointly with the other parent.  Recognizing their own 
ownership positions in the JV will soften parents’ incentives to compete, which will be manifest 
in their own pricing decisions as well as in their design for the JV. We have demonstrated the 
potential for anticompetitive outcomes in an otherwise competitive environment and we have 
seen that the presence of JVs can affect the gains to collusion.   
We have shown how the anticompetitive effects depend on the governance structure of 
the joint venture.  Independent joint ventures, in which the JV chooses its price to maximize its 
own profit, tend not to be as profitable for the parents as more cooperative joint ventures which 
set prices to maximize total profits. 
We have also shown that the effects of the JV will depend on whether the parents let it be 
a price leader as opposed to choosing price at the same time as they do.  Price leadership by the 
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JV tends to be more profitable for the parents and more harmful to consumers as it results in 
even higher prices.  Consumer surplus under an independent JV will increase if prices are set 
simultaneously, however consumer surplus will fall under an independent JV  that is a price 
leader and in both simultaneous and leadership model with more cooperative JVs. 
The introduction of a joint venture can have implications for the effects of collusion as 
well.  Collusion with a JV can be more profitable than collusion without a JV if fixed costs are 
low enough, and collusion with a JV is always worse for consumers (than collusion without a 
JV).  This suggests a kind of complementarity between JVs and collusion.   Importantly, 
however, they can also be substitutes:  we show that adding a cooperative JV can, in some cases, 
be as profitable a strategy for parents as them jointly setting their two prices – and with lower 
risk of running afoul of antitrust laws.  
Most of the effects described here will depend to some extent on the fixed costs 
associated with introducing a new product.  This is intuitive, of course:  if fixed costs are high 
enough, no type of JV can be profitable.  As we consider lower levels of fixed costs, however, 
we observe a number of critical values that determine what arrangements increase or decrease 
profits, consumer surplus and total surplus.   
Importantly, these results are not driven by forces described in the earlier literature.  For 
example, they do no derive from the JV “filling gaps” and thereby preventing entry by a new 
player – though this effect can arise here as well, adding to the effects we study.  We show that, 
even if there is no threat of new, independent entry, there are conditions under which parents will 
still want to create a buffer JV to influence the competition between themselves.   The results are 
also not due to granting the parents direct control over each other (as with cross-ownership).  In 
setting their own produce prices in the static game, each parent simply maximizes its own profit 
– though this does now include some share of the profits of the new JV.  
The model developed here suggests some factors competition authorities might want to 
consider when evaluating a joint venture for its anticompetitive potential.  First, where does the 
JV lie in relation to its parents in product or geographic space – is it in a buffering position?  
Second, how is the JV governed – does it run as an independent operation, at arms-length from 
its parents, or do the parents jointly control key strategic decisions, for example over price?  
Third, does it appear that the JV has been positioned as the price leader in the market?  Fourth, 
an examination of pricing levels after the creation of the JV might suggest that the JV has 
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enabled the parents to reach less competitive outcomes, possibly even leading them to explicitly 
collude. 
The model here is highly stylized and a number of directions for future research suggest 
themselves.  First, our Hotelling set-up combined with assumptions assuring market coverage 
has meant that there were no output effects (with the associated deadweight loss) from higher 
prices.  A more general model of differentiation would allow for quantity effects and would, we 
conjecture, provide results in which JVs were even more harmful to total welfare than they are 
here.   Pushing the model of differentiation further, we could allow firms to compete over more 
than just price and location.  In the spirit of Winter (1993), for example, we could add an 
additional aspect of differentiation which would open up the question of where the parents would 
choose to locate their JV.  We could also, of course, consider other cost functions – for example 
quadratic transportation costs.   
Finally, we could consider the implications of joint ventures for the stability of collusion 
between parents.  Preliminary work has suggested that, while the presence of a JV between the 
parents does have a buffering effect reducing the gains from defection for any given collusive 
price, the higher prices made possible with the JV filling the product space make for fatter profit 
margins and stronger incentives to deviate.  The net effect of these opposing forces will 
determine whether cartels with JVs are more or less stable.     
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Appendix 
 
A1. Entry by an Independent Third Firm 
 
Here we investigate the conditions under which a third firm might want to place a product 
between A and B.  To do so, we consider the following two-stage game.  At stage 1, the potential 
entrant decides whether to enter the market by offering good C (located at 𝑥𝑥 = 0.5).   At stage 2, 
the three firms choose their prices simultaneously.   
Recall that the demand functions for the three goods are represented in (1). Using these 
demand functions, we solve the profit-maximization problems of the three firms and find their 
best-response functions: 
𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 = 𝑡𝑡 + 2𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶4 .                       (𝐴𝐴1) 
𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 = 𝑡𝑡 + 2𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶4 .                     (𝐴𝐴2) 
𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 = 𝑡𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 + 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵4 .              (𝐴𝐴3) 
  
Solving the equation system (A1)-(A3), we find the equilibrium prices at stage 2:  
𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴
𝐸𝐸 = 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸 = 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 = 𝑡𝑡2.         (𝐴𝐴4) 
Substituting (A4) into the demand functions in (1), we obtain the entrant’s equilibrium quantity 
𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶
𝐸𝐸 = 𝑀𝑀 2⁄ . Using the equilibrium price and quantity, we find the entrant’s gross profit 𝜋𝜋𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 =
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 4⁄ .  Hence, the entrant would choose to enter the market if 𝜋𝜋𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 ≥ 𝐹𝐹, i.e., if 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 4⁄ . In this 
scenario, the profit of each incumbent is Π1𝐸𝐸 = Π2𝐸𝐸 = 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 8⁄ .  Using (15) and (16), we calculate 
the consumer surplus and total surplus in this scenario: 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 = 𝑀𝑀(𝑉𝑉 − 5𝑡𝑡 8⁄ ) and 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 =
𝑀𝑀(𝑉𝑉 − 𝑡𝑡 8⁄ ) − 𝐹𝐹.  Comparing the total surplus in this scenario with that in the two-product 
benchmark, we see that the entry of a third product -- by lowering average travel costs -- will 
increase total surplus as long as F<Mt/8.  Therefore, in the range   Mt/8<F<Mt/4 independent 
entry could happen that would be inefficient.  
 
A2. Condition that Leads to Drastic Price Deviations  
 
In this section, we demonstrate that a parent firm will engage in drastic price deviations if the JV 
sets its price above 5𝑡𝑡 3⁄ .  A drastic price deviation occurs when a parent firm makes such a 
large price cut that it will steal the entire market share of the JV and face direct competition from 
the other parent firm.  Specifically, a parent firm can achieve this by cutting its price below 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 −
𝑡𝑡/2, where 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶  is the price of JV’s product.  In this scenario, the demand for the product of the 
deviating parent is given by (2) instead of (1). 
Without loss of generality, we consider a drastic price deviation by firm 1.  Given that this is 
a unilateral price deviation, firm 2 continues to set its price in accordance with its best-response 
function (9).  Therefore, the (drastic) deviation price chosen by firm 1 is the solution to 
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max𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴  Π1 = 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 + 12𝜋𝜋𝐶𝐶 = 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 �12 − 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 − 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵2𝑡𝑡 �   s. t.  𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 = 𝑡𝑡 + 3𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶4  and  𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 ≤ 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 − 𝑡𝑡2.     (𝐴𝐴5) 
Note that 𝜋𝜋𝐶𝐶 = 0 in (A5) because firm 1 steals the entire market share from the JV.   
Let Π1𝐷𝐷 denote the (constrained) maximum of (A5).  It turns out that the solution to (A5) 
depends on 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶.  If 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 ≥ (9 5⁄ )𝑡𝑡, the inequality constraint in (A5) is slack, in which case firm 1’s 
deviation payoff is  
Π1
𝐷𝐷 = 𝑀𝑀(3𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 + 5𝑡𝑡)2128𝑡𝑡 .                          (𝐴𝐴6) 
On the other hand, firm 1’s gross profit (for any given 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶) from following its best-response 
function (8) is 
Π1
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡2 + 16𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 − 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶2)32𝑡𝑡 .         (𝐴𝐴7) 
A comparison of (A6) with (A7) shows that Π1𝐷𝐷 > Π1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 for 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 ≥ (9 5⁄ )𝑡𝑡; in other words, firm 1 
will have incentives to engage in drastic price deviation if the price set by the JV exceeds (9 5⁄ )𝑡𝑡. 
If 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 < (9 5⁄ )𝑡𝑡, the inequality constraint in (A5) is binding, in which case firm 1’s 
deviation payoff is  
Π1
𝐷𝐷 = 𝑀𝑀(𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 − 𝑡𝑡 2⁄ )(7𝑡𝑡 − 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶)8𝑡𝑡 .               (𝐴𝐴8) 
Comparing (A8) with (A7), we find that Π1𝐷𝐷 > Π1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 for 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 ∈ ((5 3)𝑡𝑡,⁄  (9 5⁄ )𝑡𝑡) and Π1𝐷𝐷 ≤ Π1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 
for 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 ≤ (5 3)⁄ 𝑡𝑡.  Therefore, firm 1 (and by the same reasoning, firm 2) will engage in drastic 
price deviation if and only if 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 > (5 3)⁄ 𝑡𝑡. 
 
A3. Mixed Strategy Equilibrium under Simultaneous Price-Setting 
 
In section IV, we have explained that if 𝛼𝛼 > 8 9⁄ , only a mixed-strategy equilibrium is possible 
under simultaneous price-setting. Because this game has more than two players and has non-
linear payoff functions, we are not able to find a closed form solution for the equilibrium mixed 
strategies. Instead, we will derive an upper bound for the expected profit of a parent firm in a 
mixed-strategy equilibrium. 
Let 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖) denote the cumulative distribution function of a firm’s prices, with subscript 
𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴 (respectively, 𝐵𝐵 and 𝐶𝐶) indicating firm 1’s (respectively, firm 2’s and JV’s) prices.  In a 
mixed-strategy equilibrium, a player earns the same expected payoff from playing any pair of 
pure strategies within its price distribution, and it would earn a lower expected payoff from 
playing a pure strategy outside its price distribution.  We use these two properties of a mixed-
strategy equilibrium to delineate the support of 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖).  
Let [𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 ,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖ℎ] be the support of product 𝑖𝑖’s price (𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶) in a mixed strategy 
equilibrium.  Given that 𝛼𝛼 > 8 9⁄ , the JV’s best-response function in (12) prescribes a price (𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶) 
that exceeds (5 3⁄ )𝑡𝑡, the threshold above which each parent firm has incentives to engage in 
drastic price deviations.  At 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 = (5 3⁄ )𝑡𝑡, the best-response of a parent firm is to set 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 =(3 2⁄ )𝑡𝑡  (𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵) as per (12).  This implies that 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖ℎ ≤ (3 2⁄ )𝑡𝑡 (𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵) because starting from 
this point a parent firm will find it profitable to cut its price drastically in response to an increase 
in 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶.   
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From (12), we also find that when 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 = 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 = (3 2⁄ )𝑡𝑡, the best-response price of the JV 
would have been 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 = [(4 + 3𝛼𝛼) 4⁄ ]𝑡𝑡 in the absence of drastic price deviations. This implies 
that 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶ℎ ≤ [(4 + 3𝛼𝛼) 4⁄ ]𝑡𝑡 because any higher price will only reduce the JV’s expected payoff.  
Note that (4 + 3𝛼𝛼) 4⁄ ≤ (7 4⁄ )𝑡𝑡 for 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 1.  Hence,  𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶ℎ ≤ (7 4⁄ )𝑡𝑡 for any 𝛼𝛼 ∈ (8 9⁄ , 1]. 
Note that at 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 = (5 3⁄ )𝑡𝑡, a parent firm needs to lower its price to 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = (5 3⁄ )𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡 2⁄ =(7 6⁄ )𝑡𝑡 in order to drastically undercut the JV’s price.  Below we show that 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 ≥ (7 6⁄ )𝑡𝑡 (𝑖𝑖 =
𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵) and 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙 ≥ (5 3⁄ )𝑡𝑡.   
Without loss of generality, we use firm 1 as a representative of the parent firms.  Suppose 
𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴
𝑙𝑙 < (7 6⁄ )𝑡𝑡, and consider the parent firm’s expected payoff from choosing a price 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 ∈[𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙 , (7 6⁄ )𝑡𝑡).   At such a low price, firm 1 competes directly with the other parent firm.  Hence, 
its expected profit  is E(Π1) − 𝐹𝐹2 = � 𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 �12 + 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 − 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴2𝑡𝑡 �𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵(𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵) − 𝐹𝐹2 .    (𝐴𝐴9) 
For firm 1 to randomize its price over [𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙 , (7 6⁄ )𝑡𝑡), the value of (A9) has to be constant for 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 in 
this range.  This entails 
∂E(Π1)
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴
= � 𝑀𝑀�12 + 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 − 2𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴2𝑡𝑡 �𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵(𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵) = 0     (𝐴𝐴10) 
for any 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 ∈ [𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙 , (7 6⁄ )𝑡𝑡).  However, (A10) can be satisfied by only one value of 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴, given by  
𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 = 𝑡𝑡 + ∫ 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵(𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵)2 .                     (𝐴𝐴11) 
In other words, firm 1 will not randomize its price over [𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙 , (7 6⁄ )𝑡𝑡), which contradicts the 
supposition that 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙 < (7 6⁄ )𝑡𝑡.  Hence, 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙 ≥ (7 6⁄ )𝑡𝑡.   
We can use the same method to prove that 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙 ≥ (5 3⁄ )𝑡𝑡.  Suppose 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙 < (5 3⁄ )𝑡𝑡. 
Consider the JV’s expected payoff from choosing a price 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 ∈ [𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙 , (5 3⁄ )𝑡𝑡), which is  E�Π𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽� = � � Π𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵(𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵)𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴(𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴),𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵ℎ
𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵
𝑙𝑙
  𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴ℎ
𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴
𝑙𝑙
             (𝐴𝐴12) 
where Π𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽 is given in (10).  For the JV to randomize its price over [𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙 , (5 3⁄ )𝑡𝑡), the value of 
(A12) has to be constant for 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 in this interval.  This entails 
∂E(Π𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽)
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶
= 𝑀𝑀2𝑡𝑡 � � [𝑡𝑡 + (1 + 𝛼𝛼)𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 + (1 + 𝛼𝛼)𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 − 4𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶]𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵(𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵)𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴(𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴) = 0𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙 .       (𝐴𝐴13) 
But there is only one value of 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 that satisfied (A13).  This implies that the JV will not 
randomize its price over [𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙 , (5 3⁄ )𝑡𝑡), which contradicts the supposition that 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙 < (5 3⁄ )𝑡𝑡.  
Hence, 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙 ≥ (5 3⁄ )𝑡𝑡. 
To summarize, the preceding analysis shows that �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙, 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖ℎ� ⊂ [(7 6⁄ )𝑡𝑡, (3 2⁄ )𝑡𝑡] for 𝑖𝑖 =
𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵 and �𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙 ,𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶ℎ� ⊂ [(5 3⁄ )𝑡𝑡, (7 4⁄ )𝑡𝑡].  We can further narrow the support of the parents’ prices 
by showing that 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖ℎ ≤ (5 4⁄ )𝑡𝑡  for 𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵.  We do so by using the same method as above.  
Specifically, suppose that 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴ℎ > (5 4⁄ )𝑡𝑡  and consider firm 1’s expected profit for 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 ∈
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((5 4⁄ )𝑡𝑡,𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴ℎ ].  Note that (7 4⁄ )𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡 2⁄ = (5 4⁄ )𝑡𝑡.  With 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 > (5 4⁄ )𝑡𝑡, firm 1 will not steal the 
JV’s entire market share (but firm 2 may).  Thus, firm 1’s expected profit for 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 in this range is  E(Π1) − 𝐹𝐹2 = � � 𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡2 + 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 − 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴2𝑡𝑡 )𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵(𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵)𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶(𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶)𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶−𝑡𝑡2𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙  𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙+ � � �𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 �14 − 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 − 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶2𝑡𝑡 � + 𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶2 �12 − 2𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 − 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 − 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵2𝑡𝑡 �� 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵(𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵)𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶(𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶)𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶−𝑡𝑡2  𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙
−
𝐹𝐹2 .             (𝐴𝐴14) 
Again, we can show that 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(Π1) 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴⁄ = 0 is satisfied by only one value of 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴, which implies 
that firm 1 will not randomize over 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 ∈ ((5 4⁄ )𝑡𝑡,𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴ℎ ].  Hence, 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴ℎ ≤ (5 4⁄ )𝑡𝑡.   
Combining all the findings about the support of each product’s price, we conclude that 
�𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝑙𝑙,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖ℎ� ⊂ [(7 6⁄ )𝑡𝑡, (5 4⁄ )𝑡𝑡] for 𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵 and  �𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙 ,𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶ℎ� ⊂ [(5 3⁄ )𝑡𝑡, (7 4⁄ )𝑡𝑡].  Next, we use this 
information to determine an upper bound on the payoffs of the parent firms in a mixed-strategy 
equilibrium.  For this purpose, note that 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖ℎ = (5 12⁄ )𝑡𝑡 (𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵).  This implies that 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 −
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ≥ (5 12⁄ )𝑡𝑡 and hence 2𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 − 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 − 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 ≥ (5 6⁄ )𝑡𝑡 in a mixed-strategy equilibrium.  
Consider the combined gross profits in a pure-strategy equilibrium,  
Π1 + Π2 = 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 �14 − 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 − 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶2𝑡𝑡 �𝑀𝑀 + 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 �14 − 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 − 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶2𝑡𝑡 �𝑀𝑀+ 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 �12 − 2𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 − 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 − 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵2𝑡𝑡 �𝑀𝑀.                 (𝐴𝐴15) 
Using (A15), we can verify that 𝜕𝜕(Π1 + Π2) 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖⁄ > 0 if  𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 > −𝑡𝑡 4⁄  (𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵), and 
𝜕𝜕(Π1 + Π2) 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶⁄ < 0 if 2𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 − 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 − 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 > 𝑡𝑡 2⁄ .  This implies that for prices in the ranges of 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ∈[(7 6⁄ )𝑡𝑡, (5 4⁄ )𝑡𝑡]  (𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵) and 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 ∈ [(5 3⁄ )𝑡𝑡, (7 4⁄ )𝑡𝑡], the maximum value of (A15) is 
achieved at 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 = 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 = (5 4⁄ )𝑡𝑡 and 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 = (5 3⁄ )𝑡𝑡, which is equal to (185 144⁄ )𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡.  This, in 
turn, implies that the expected combined gross profits in a mixed-strategy equilibrium is below (185 144⁄ )𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡.  Taking into account the fixed costs, we conclude that the expected payoff of 
each parent firm in a mixed-strategy equilibrium is less than (185 288⁄ )𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 − 𝐹𝐹 2⁄ .    
 
A4.  Proof of Propositions 
 
Proof of Proposition 1.  The profit of a parent firm with the JV is given in (14), and its profits 
without the JV is given in (3).  This proposition is obtained by comparing these two profit levels. 
In addition, we also prove here that the market is covered in equilibrium given the assumption 
that 𝑉𝑉 > (11 6⁄ )𝑡𝑡.  To see this, note that the highest prices that can be achieved without causing 
drastic price deviations are associated with 𝛼𝛼 = 9 8⁄ .  The corresponding prices are 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 = 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 =(3 2⁄ )𝑡𝑡 and 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 = (5 3⁄ )𝑡𝑡.  At these prices, the consumer who is indifferent between purchasing 
product A and product C is located at 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡 3⁄ .  This consumer pays a delivered price of (3 2⁄ )𝑡𝑡 + 𝑡𝑡 3⁄ = (11 6⁄ )𝑡𝑡, which is the highest among all consumers along the Hotelling line. 
This consumer indeed purchases a unit in equilibrium given the assumption that 𝑉𝑉 > (11 6⁄ )𝑡𝑡.  
Since equilibrium prices are lower for smaller values of 𝛼𝛼, this assumption ensures that the 
market is covered in equilibrium.  QED 
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Proof of Proposition 2. The result follows from the comparison of consumer surplus in (17) with 
(5).  QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. The result follows from the comparison of total surplus given in (18) 
with (6).  QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 4. From (14), we know that 𝜕𝜕Π𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼⁄ > 0 for all 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 8 9⁄ . Hence, the 
highest level of profit in a pure-strategy equilibrium is achieved at 𝛼𝛼 = 8 9⁄ , which is (7 9⁄ )𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 − 𝐹𝐹 2⁄ .  If the parent firms set 𝛼𝛼 > 8 9⁄ , a mixed-strategy equilibrium would prevail 
and, as shown in section A3, the expected payoff of each parent firm would be less than (185 288⁄ )𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 − 𝐹𝐹 2⁄ .  Since (7 9⁄ ) > (185 288⁄ ), they will set 𝛼𝛼 = 8 9⁄  if they choose to 
establish the JV.  Setting 𝛼𝛼 = 8 9⁄  in Proposition 1, we find that establishing the JV is profitable 
if 𝐹𝐹 < (5 9⁄ )𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡.  The rest of this proposition follows from Propositions 2 and 3.  
 
Proof of Proposition 5. For 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 2 21⁄ , the result is obtained by comparing the profit levels in 
(22) and (3). For 𝛼𝛼 > 2 21⁄ , it follows from the comparison of (7 9⁄ )𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 − 𝐹𝐹 2⁄  with (3). QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 6. For 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 2 21⁄ , the result is obtained by comparing the levels of 
consumer surplus in (23) and (5).  For 𝛼𝛼 > 2 21⁄ , the consumer surplus is constant at 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =
𝑀𝑀[𝑉𝑉 − (61 32⁄ )𝑡𝑡] (which is obtained by setting 𝛼𝛼 = 2 21⁄  in (23)).  This is lower than the level 
of consumer surplus in (5).  QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 7. For 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 2 21⁄ , the result is obtained by comparing the levels of total 
surplus in (24) and (6).  For 𝛼𝛼 > 2 21⁄ , the total surplus is constant at 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 = 𝑀𝑀[𝑉𝑉 − (5 36⁄ )𝑡𝑡] −
𝐹𝐹 (which is obtained by setting 𝛼𝛼 = 2 21⁄  in (24)).  The result follows from comparing it with 
the level of total surplus in (6). QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 8. From (14), we know that 𝜕𝜕Π𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼⁄ > 0 for all 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 2 21⁄ .  For 𝛼𝛼 > 2 21⁄ , 
the equilibrium profit of a parent firm is constant at (7 9⁄ )𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 − 𝐹𝐹 2⁄ , which is the same level as 
at 𝛼𝛼 = 2 21⁄ .  Therefore, the parent firms will set 𝛼𝛼 ≥ 2 21⁄  if they choose to establish the JV. 
The rest of this proposition follows from Propositions 5-7.  QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 9. The combined profits of the two firms are equal to 2 times the level 
given in (14) (under simultaneous price-setting) and (22) (under price leadership).  It is 
straightforward to show that for 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 2 21⁄ , the profit level in (22) is greater than that in (14).  
For 𝛼𝛼 ∈ (2 21⁄ , 8 9⁄ ], the profit level of each parent under price leadership is constant at (7 9⁄ )𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 − 𝐹𝐹 2⁄ .  The profit of each parent under simultaneous price-setting, on the other hand, 
monotonically increases with 𝛼𝛼 in this interval, reaching its highest level of (7 9⁄ )𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 − 𝐹𝐹 2⁄  at 
𝛼𝛼 = 8 9⁄ .  This implies that the combined profits of the parents under JV price leadership are 
higher than combined profits with a JV under simultaneous price-setting for 𝛼𝛼 ∈ (2 21⁄ , 8 9⁄ ).  
QED   
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Proof of Proposition 10.  It is straightforward to show that for 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 2 21⁄ , the level of consumer 
surplus in (23) is lower than that in (17).  For 𝛼𝛼 ∈ (2 21⁄ , 8 9⁄ ], the level of consumer surplus 
under price leadership is constant at 𝑀𝑀[(𝑉𝑉 − (61 36⁄ )𝑡𝑡].  Using (14), we find that the level of 
consumer surplus under simultaneous price-setting monotonically decreases with 𝛼𝛼 in this 
interval, with its level equal to 𝑀𝑀[(𝑉𝑉 − (61 36⁄ )𝑡𝑡] at 𝛼𝛼 = 8 9⁄ .  This implies that consumer 
surplus under price leadership is lower than that under simultaneous price-setting for 𝛼𝛼 ∈(2 21⁄ , 8 9⁄ ).   
As for total surplus, we set 𝛼𝛼 = 0 in (18) and (24) to find that total surplus under 
simultaneous price-setting is higher than that under price leadership at this value of 𝛼𝛼.  
Moreover, we differentiate (18) to find that under simultaneous price-setting, 
𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼
= 7𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡(1 − 2𝛼𝛼)4(5 − 3𝛼𝛼)3 � > 0 if 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [0, 1 2)⁄ ; < 0 if 𝛼𝛼 ∈ (1 2⁄ , 8 9⁄ ].           (𝐴𝐴16) 
On the other hand, from (24) we find that under price leadership,  
𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼
= − 13𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡(2 + 5𝛼𝛼)8(4 − 3𝛼𝛼)3 < 0  for any 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [0, 2 21⁄ ].             (𝐴𝐴17) 
Eq. (A16) and (A17) imply that for 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [0, 2 21⁄ ], total surplus rises under simultaneous price-
setting but falls under price leadership.  Hence, total surplus is higher under simultaneous price-
setting than under price leadership for 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [0, 2 21⁄ ].  For 𝛼𝛼 ∈ (2 21⁄ , 8 9⁄ ], total surplus under 
price leadership remains constant at the level of 𝛼𝛼 = 2 21⁄ .  Under simultaneous price-setting, 
(A16) implies that total surplus first rises and then falls, and at 𝛼𝛼 = 8 9⁄  it falls to the same level 
as the total surplus under price leadership. This implies that total surplus is higher under 
simultaneous price-setting than under price leadership for 𝛼𝛼 ∈ (2 21⁄ , 8 9⁄ ).  QED   
 
Proof of Proposition 11. Using (25) and (27), we find that collusion with the JV is more 
profitable than collusion without the JV if and only if 12𝑀𝑀�𝑉𝑉 − 14 𝑡𝑡� − 𝐹𝐹2 > 𝑀𝑀4 (2𝑉𝑉 − 𝑡𝑡).             (𝐴𝐴18) 
This implies 𝐹𝐹 < 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 4⁄ .  QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 12. The levels of consumer surplus in these two cases are given in (28) and 
(29).  The result follows directly from the comparison of these two levels. QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 13.  The level of total surplus under collusion with two products is equal to 
that in (6), and that under collusion with the JV is in (30).  The result follows directly from the 
comparison of these two levels.  QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 14.  The gross profit for each parent under price-leading JV, calculated by 
setting 𝛼𝛼 = 2 21⁄  in (22), is (7 9⁄ )𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 − 𝐹𝐹 2⁄ .  From (25), we see that each firm’s profit under 
collusion with two products is 𝑀𝑀 (2𝑉𝑉 − 𝑡𝑡) 4⁄ .  The result follows from the comparison of these 
two profit levels.  QED 
